Twenty-two miffion families currently receive a total of $34 billion in benefits from the earned income tax credit (EITC). In fact, the EITC is the largest cash-transfer program for lower-income families at the federal level. An unusual feature of the credit is its explicit goal to use the tax system to encourage and support those who choose to work. A large body of work has evaluated the labor supply effects of the EITC and has generated several important findings regarding the behavioral response to taxes. Perhaps the main lesson learned from the evidence is the confirmation that real responses to taxes are important; labor supply does respond to the EITC. The second major lesson is related to the nature of the labor supply response. A consistent finding is that labor supply responses are concentrated along the extensive (entry) margin, rather than the intensive (hours worked) margin. This distinction has important implications for the design of tax-transfer programs and for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms.
Introduction and Overview
The past two decades in the United States have witnessed an increasing reliance on the tax system as a means of providing cash assistance to lower-income families with children. A series of tax acts starting with the 1986 Tax Reform Act have increased assistance to the working poor through expansions of the earned income tax credit (EITC), making it the largest federal cash-transfer program for lower-income families with children. Over 20 million families are projected to have benefited from the tax credit in 2003, at a total cost to the federal government of more than $34 billion.' These transfers have been especially successful at reducing poverty in the United States. In fact, census data suggest that the federal credit now lifts more children out of poverty than any other government program. "Some 4.9 million people, including 2.7 million children, were removed from poverty in 2002 as a result of the federal EITC" (Liobrera and Zahradnik 2004) . These estimates are consistent with the fact that the 1993 credit expansion was designed such that a full-time worker earning the minimum wage would not live in poverty.
This shift in the structure of public assistance is the outcome of a long-standing criticism that traditional welfare programs generate adverse incentives for work and family. Advocates of the earned income tax credit have argued that the credit helps "promote both the values of family and work." Indeed, economic theory suggests that the EITC should be especially successful at promoting entry into the labor force among eligible, single taxpayers.
The recent expansions have offered researchers an excellent opportunity to evaluate the impacts of the EITC on behavior. Hotz and Scholz's (2003) review of the literature on the EITC shows that researchers have taken full advantage of this opportunity, examining outcomes such as work behavior, marriage, fertility, consumption expenditures, and overall family well-being. Here, we concentrate on the impacts of the EITC on labor supply and in particular on the lessons learned about the labor supply responses to tax-transfer programs. We argue that the evaluation of the EITC has been especially useful for understanding the size and the composition of labor supply responses to tax incentives and has informed the literature on the welfare evaluation of tax reforms as well as the optimal design of tax-transfer schemes.
In this review, we first provide a brief history of the EITC, along with a description of the current policies and recent tax expansions. In Section 3, we provide a descriptive analysis of the EITC population. In particular, we use IRS data to examine the characteristics of EITC recipients, including number of children, filing status, and income. In Section 4, we use economic theory to discuss the expected impact of the EITC on labor supply. In short, among eligible unmarried women with children, the EITC is expected to increase employment but reduce hours of work for those already in the labor market. To target benefits to lower-income families, however, the EITC is based on family income, leading to a very different set of incentives for married taxpayers. Among secondary earners in married couples, the EITC is expected to reduce labor force participation and hours worked for those already in the labor force.
Section 5 summarizes what is known about the impacts of the EITC on labor supply. The nature of the expected labor supply effects of the EITC leads us to structure our summary in the following manner. First, we examine the impacts on single and married taxpayers separately, focusing exclusively on women.2 Second, we examine separately the two different margins of labor supply responsesthe extensive (employment) and intensive (hours worked by working individuals) margins. The overwhelming finding of the empirical literature is that EITC has been especially successful at encouraging the employment of single parents, especially mothers. There is little evidence, however, that the EITC has reduced the hours worked by those already in the labor force. The empirical literature on married women is somewhat smaller but again consistent in its findings. The studies show that the EITC leads to modest reductions in the employment and hours worked of married women.
In Section 6, we discuss the possible explanations for the empirical finding that the EITC affects the extensive but not the intensive margin.
We also discuss the general equilibrium implications of the EITCin particular whether the EITC affects gross wages. Finally, we discuss the implications of this work for the optimal design of the EITC. Recent work has emphasized the role of the extensive margin in the design of the tax-transfer schemes (Saez 2002 ) and the welfare evaluation of tax reform (Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner 2004) . We first review this work and then discuss whether there are potential efficiency gains associated with modifying the EITC. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
Operation and Brief History of the EITC
The Earned Income Tax Credit began in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting the Social Security payroll tax for low-income families with children. It was the outcome of a vigorous policy debate sur- rounding the efficacy of a negative income tax (NIT) as a means of reducing poverty. The concern was that the MTwhich guarantees a minimum standard of living to everyonewould discourage labor market activity as it is gradually phased out. Ultimately the EITC was born out of a desire to reward work.
The EITC is refundable, so that a taxpayer with no federal tax liability, for example, would receive a tax refund from the government for (Friedman 2000) . A taxpayer's eligibility for the earned income tax credit depends on the taxpayer's earned income (or in some cases, adjusted gross income) and the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relationship, and residency tests. First, the taxpayer must have positive earned income, defined as wage and salary income, business sell-employment income, and farm sell-employment income.
Also, the taxpayer must have adjusted gross income and earned income below a specified amount (in 2004, the maximum allowable income for a taxpayer with two or more children was $34,458). Second, a taxpayer must have a qualifying child, who must be under age 19 (or age 24 if a full-time student) or permanently disabled and residing with the taxpayer for more than half the year.3 Until 1991, the rides for EITC eligibility were more complicated and depended on the taxpayer's filing status.4
The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the taxpayer's earned income; adjusted gross income; and, since 1991, the number of EITC-eligible children in the household. There are three regions in the credit schedule. The initial phase-in region transfers an amount equal to the subsidy rate times their earnings. In tax year 2004, the subsidy rate of the EITC was 34 percent for taxpayers with one child and 40 percent for taxpayers with two or more children. hi the flat region, the family receives the maximum credit ($2,604 and $4,300, respectively), while in the phase-out region, the credit is phased out at the phase-out rate (16 and 21 percent). Table 3 .1 summarizes the parameters of the EITC over the history of the program. The program grew slowly from its introduction in 1975 until 1986, and in fact shrank in real terms due to inflation. The 1987 expansion of the EITC, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), increased the generosity of the credit for the lowest-income workers and extended its benefits beyond the poorest (see Eissa and Liebman 1996) . By 1988, taxpayers with incomes between $11,000 and $18,576 became eligible for the credit and faced its phase-out marginal tax rate for the first time. The 1987 EITC expansion interacted with other tax changes implemented after TRA86including greater personal exemption and standard deductionto help eliminate taxes on poor families. The largest single expansion over this period was contained in the Omnibus Reconcifiation Act of 1993 (OBRA93). The Notes: Authors' tabulations using tax parameters in table 3.1.
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Earned income 1993 expansion of the EITC, phased in between 1994 and 1996, led to an increase in the subsidy rate, from 19.5 percent to 40 percent (18.5 to 34 percent), and an increase in the maximum credit, from $1,511 to $3,556 ($1,434 to $2,152), for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with one child). This expansion was substantially larger for those with two or more children. The phase-out rate was also raised, from 14 percent to 21 percent (13 to 16 percent), for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with one child). Overall, the range of the phase-out was expanded dramatically so that, by 1996, a filing unit with two children would still be eligible with income levels of almost $30,000. These expansions have led to a dramatic and recent increase in the total cost of the EITC. An important observation about the EITC is that the credit is based on annual earnings. As a result, its relationship to a worker's hourly wage is indirect. Figure 3 .3 shows exposure to the credit at different annual hours worked and hourly wages. Among full-time workers, those earning the minimum wage receive the maximum credit, while those earning $15 per hour would just miss eligibifity. Moreover, the greater generosity of the program for two-child families implies that slightly higher-wage families would be eligible for the credit. This indirect relationship has implications for the interpretation of the empirical evidence. We return to this issue in Section 6. children compared to $1,578 for those with one childreflecting the more generous schedule for families with two or more children. In addition, average EITC claims for single parents exceed average payments to married couples filing jointly. As above, this reflects the higher incomes of married couples. Table 3 .4 presents the percentage distribution of returns and expenditures for tax ifiers with children by EITC bracket, using 2001 SOT data. This distribution is the critical determinant of the net labor supply effect of the EITC and its expansion (see discussion in the next section). The table shows that about one-quarter of EITC head of household returns and expenditures go to filers in the subsidy (phasein) region of the credit. Far fewer married couples (about 15 percent) have income that place them in that region of the credit, however. It is useful to separate single and married filers because the design of the EITC can generate very different labor supply incentives for these two populations. In general, most EITC tax returns are located in the phase-out region of the credit. This is especially true for married couples where about half of head of household and more than two-thirds of married couples are in the phase-out region. EITC expenditures show broadly the same pattern, though the distribution is slightly more evenly spread across the regions. About one-quarter of EITC benefits for head of household filers go to those in the subsidy region, while about 40-50 percent of benefits go to those in the phase-out region. Among married couples, the data show only 15 percent of dollars benefit those with the lowest income, while more thar half of the dollars go those in the phase-out region.
The SOl reports include a very limited set of observable characteristics of EITC recipients. We expand our discussion by presenting a picture of the EITC population using survey data, which represents the data used in essentially all evaluations of the labor supply effects of the credit. In particular, we provide demographic characteristics of single motherswho represent the largest group of EITC recipients.
Eissa, Kieven, and Kreiner (EKK) (2004) provide summary statistics for a sample of single mothers age 18-49 from the 1986 , 1991 , 1994 , covering income and earnings data for the prior calendar year-1985 year- , 1990 year- , 1993 year- , and 2000 as the difference between total income and earnings, and therefore includes income for various sources such as welfare assistance, capital income, Social Security income and worker's compensation. The wage is defined for workers only and is topcoded at $200 in 2000. Tax rates are calculated using NEER's TAXSIM model and include all federal income taxes and the payroll tax (assuming individuals bear the entire tax). Calculations for "Effect of Tax Act" use the sample for a fixed year and include tax rates under the old law and the new law-the differences are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. All monetary amounts are in nominal dollars. (961) 1219 (969) 1148 (970) 1426 (903) Wage and salary income over the 15-year periodby just under a year and a halfand has fewer children and more education. The most striking change for single mothers during this period is clearly the increase in labor supply, observed along both the margin of participation and hours worked.
Expected Effects of the EITC
In this section, we examine the impact of the credit on labor supply and discuss the expected impacts on the extensive (employment) and intensive (hours worked by working individuals) margins.7 The participation and hours incentives are modeled assuming that taxpayers face no labor market restrictions in their choice of hours, given the (fixed) offered wage.8 For simplicity, we consider first the case of an unmarried taxpayer and then extend the analysis to examine labor supply incentives for married couples.
Unmarried Taxpayers
Because the EITC is available only to taxpayers with earned income, standard labor supply theory predicts that the EITC will encourage labor force participation among single parents. The stylized budget constraint, in figure 3.4, shows this impact graphically.
The figure plots hours worked (horizontal axis) against income (vertical axis), ignoring for simplicity all other features of the taxtransfer system that affect single parents.9 In the absence of the EITC, the taxpayer earns a gross wage w for each hour workedhence, the no-EITC budget constraint is given by segment AD, with slope w. The EITC alters the budget constraint to ABCD. In the phase-in region (AB), the EITC acts as a pure wage subsidy and increases the net wage from w to w(1 + r) where r is the subsidy rate (40 percent for taxpayers with two or more children and 34 percent for taxpayers with one child in 2004). In the flat region of the credit (BC), the taxpayer's budget constraint is shifted out an amount equal to the maximum credit ($2,604 for taxpayers with one child and $4,300 for taxpayers with two or more children in 2004) and her gross (and net of tax) hourly wage is w. Each dollar earned in the phaseout region of the EITC (CD) reduces the credit by a phaseout rate of rp (about 21 percent). The net wage earned by the taxpayer in this region, w(1 -may be reduced even further once the taxpayer starts paying federal tax. This figure is drawn to reflect the fact that the phase-out region of the credit is much larger than the phase-in region. For example, for a single woman with two children in 2004, the phase-in region spans about $10,000 (from $0 to $10,750) while the phase-out region spans about $20,000 (from $14,040 to $34,458).
The figure shows that the well-being of a taxpayer who is not working is not affected by the EITC. Any taxpayer who preferred working before will stifi prefer working, and some taxpayers may find that the additional after-tax income from the EITC makes it worth entering the labor force. Therefore, the impact of introducing or expanding the EITC on the labor force participation of unmarried taxpayers is unambiguously positive.
The impact of the EITC on the hours worked by a single working taxpayer, however, depends on which region of the credit the taxpayer is in before the credit is expanded or introduced. If she is in the phase-in region, the EITC leads to an ambiguous impact on hours worked due to the negative income effect and positive substitution effect. In the flat region, however, the EITC produces a negative income effect, leading to an unambiguous reduction in hours worked. In the phase-out region, the EITC produces a negative income and negative substitution effect, leading again to an unambiguous reduction in hours worked. Moreover, the phase-out of the credit alters the budget set in such a way that some taxpayers with incomes beyond the phase-out region may choose to reduce their hours of work and take advantage of the credit. Recall from table 3.4 above that about three-quarters of single EITC recipients have earnings in the flat and phase-out region of the creditthus, the expectation is that the EITC will reduce the number of hours worked by most eligible single taxpayers already in the labor force.
To illustrate how the EITC affects the incentives faced by single taxpayers, These calculations show that the EITC reduces average tax rates of entering (part-and full-time) work across all family sizes and all wage levels, thereby illustrating the prediction that participation should unambiguously increase for single parents. The impact of the EITC on these tax rates for entering work can be sizable, even for higher-wage women. For example, in tax year 2004, a woman earning $10 per hour with two children faces a -25 percent average tax rate (subsidy) for entering work at part-time levels and a -3 percent average tax rate (subsidy) for entering work at full-time levels. In the absence of an EITC, the same woman would face average tax rates of 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The results show that the impacts of the EITC are greatest for lower-wage women (with more earnings in the phasein region), for part-time entrants, and for women with two or more children.
The table also ifiustrates how the EITC penalizes increasing work for those already in the work force. If a woman with two children, earning $10 per hour, were to increase work from part-to full-time, however, she faces an average tax rate of 18 percent with the EITC (due to the phase-out rate) compared to 10 percent without the EITC. This work disincentive on the intensive (hours) margin exists for all but the lowest-wage women (who even at full-time work are not yet in the phase-out region of the credit).
In addition to these tax rates for hypothetical taxpayers, Eissa, Kieven, and Kreiner (2004) use their CPS sample of single mothers for 1985, 1990, 1993, and 2000 and calculate average and marginal tax rates (using TAXSIM) at observed earnings. The results are presented in the bottom of table 3.5 (presented earlier)and their results show that the average tax rates declined consistently over the period, from 14.5 percent in 1985 to a negative 4.1 percent in 2000. It is notable that the time series change in the marginal tax rate is more moderate and less systematic than that of the average tax rate. Note that these tax rates wifi vary over time due to changes in tax policy (the EITC and all other income tax changes), and also with changes in the earnings and family size of their sample of single women.
EKK also isolate the impact of the federal tax reforms (again EITC and non-EITC tax changes) on tax rates by imputing a post-reform tax rate at given pre-reform characteristics. These results (labeled "Effect of tax act" in table 3.5) show that all tax acts since 1986 have reduced both the average and marginal tax rates faced by single taxpayers and have generally reduced tax liability (average tax rates) more significantly than marginal tax rates. The largest reduction in tax rates is due to OBRA93.
Married Taxpayers
In contrast to the predictions for single women, the EITC is expected to reduce the participation and hours worked of most eligible married women. This occurs also because the credit is based on family earnings and income. Suppose family labor supply follows a sequential model, with the husband as the primary earner and the wife as the secondary earner. In this model, the effect of the credit on the labor supply of primary earners is the same as that of single taxpayersincentives to participate in the labor market strengthen unambiguously, while hours of work incentives are ambiguous, though they are likely negative given the distribution of taxpayer income along the EITC schedule.
The impact of the EJTC on secondary earners is more complicated because it depends on the earnings of the primary earner. Assume for simplicity that the husband is the primary earner and further that his earnings place the family in the phase-out range.11 The family receives the credit if the wife remains out of the labor force, but the credit amount will decrease with each dollar earned if she enters the labor market. In the phase-out range, therefore, the EJTC unambiguously reduces hours worked and participation by raising family income and reducing the net-of-tax wage. If the husband's earnings place the family in the flat region, the credit unambiguously lowers labor-market participation and hours worked by married women (through a pure income effect). Of course, it is also possible for the wife's work effort to increase the family's credit if the husband's earnings are in the subsidy region (up to $7,660 or $10,750 in 2004, depending on the number of Note: Calculated using TAXSIM. Numbers represent the average tax rate associated with increasing labor supply (either from no work to work or from part-time to full-time work). For each calculation, the husband is assumed to be working full-time and full-year at the same hourly wage as the wife. Taxes include all federal income taxes plus the payroll tax (assuming the individual bears the entire 15.3% rate). Part-time work is assumed to be 20 hours per week and 52 weeks per year, and full-time work is assumed to be 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year. children), but very few married couples are likely to have incomes in this range.
The impact of the EITC on the labor supply of married couples therefore depends on the distribution of family income along the schedule, the distribution of earnings within the household, and the relative elasticities of labor supply with respect to taxes. Secondary earners whose spouses have earnings in the flat and phase-out regions should be less likely to work and should work fewer hours, while those whose spouses have income in the phase-in region should be more likely to work but can increase or reduce their hours worked.
Given the distribution of income, it is unlikely the EITC wifi have any positive effect on the labor supply of married women.
To ifiustrate the work incentives for married women, Second, married women with children face much higher marginal tax rates compared to single women with children. This occurs in part because the federal tax schedule is progressive, although calculations (in tables 3.6 and 3.7) show that the EITC plays an important role. The role of increasing marginal tax rates has been discussed in the taxes and labor supply literature more broadly (e.g., Eissa 1995) , but there is less discussion of the EITC in this setting.
What Have We Learned About Labor Supply and the EITC?
A large body of work has examined both the distributional impacts and the behavioral responses to the earned income tax credit, including labor supply, family formation, and consumption. Perhaps because of its explicit goal of encouraging work, the bulk of this evidence has been on labor supply. Our goal in this discussion is to summarize the major findings in the literature and to discuss their implications for the design of tax-transfer programs. Readers interested in a more exhaustive summary should see the comprehensive review by Hotz and Scholz (2003) .
To presage the main findings, there is overwhelming evidence that the EITC encourages work among single mothers but little evidence that eligible-working women adjust their hours of work in response to the EITC. Perhaps most striking about these findings is their consistency across different empirical methodsincluding both quasiexperimental methods (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Eissa and Hoynes 2004; Hotz, Mul] in, and Scholz 2002) and more structural methods (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; To interpret and compare the empirical results, we first clarify the different sources of identifying variation. While all individuals face the same tax schedule at any point in time, they face different tax rates based on their filing (i.e., family) status, family size (number of children), non-labor income, and earned income (wages and hours worked). Additionally, tax schedules, and therefore rates, vary over time with policy reforms. The main difference between the quasiexperimental approach and more structural methods is the use of group versus individual-level variation in taxes. The first approach assumes that all relevant wage and income changes are captured by group level variation in family type and size (presence and number of children) and time. The EITC effect is the change in employment (relative to that of childless women) of women with children after the EITC expansion. To the extent that tax rates, wages, and incomes are measured with error, this grouping approach reduces any measurement error bias in the coefficients of interest.
Most studies take advantage of the large federal expansions in the credit in 1986, 1990, and 1993 that affected incentives for single and married women with children. To control for other factors that may be contemporaneous with the policy changes, many studies utilize control groups and estimate difference-in-difference models. The EITC design and expansions suggest a number of possible strategiessuch as comparing women with different family sizes (presence and number of children), marital status, earnings, or education levelsfor identifying labor supply responses. These models seem to work well and provide robust estimates for the impact of the EITC on participation, but they may be less well suited for estimating the impacts on hours worked. Analyzing the determinants of hours worked is more complicated due to the changes in the composition of the working sample and the endogeneity of work more generally. We return to this final point in Section 6. First, however, we review the empirical evidence on different margins of labor supply and for different groups.
5.1 The EITC and the Labor Supply of Single Taxpayers 5.1.1 Labor Force Participation The discussion of labor supply above shows that the EITC is expected to increase the participation of single women with children and reduce the hours worked for the majority of those already in the labor force. Several papers have estimated the impact of the EITC on employment decisions of single women (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Eliwood 2000; Grogger 2003; Hotz et al. 2002; Keane and Moffitt 1998; Rosenbaun-i 2000, 2001; Rothstein 2005) , all consistently finding that the EITC increased their labor force participation.
Several papers estimate difference-in-difference models applied to a single expansion or multiple expansions of the EITC. In these models, changes in the employment rate of the treatment or eligible group (single women with children) is compared to the change in the employment rate of a control or unaffected group. This approach is used by Eissa and Liebman (EL 1996) , Ellwood (2000) , Hotz et al. (2002) , Meyer and Rosenbaum (MR 2000) , and Rothstein (2005) . The most common control group is childless single women (EL 1996 , MR 2000 , Rothstein 2005 . Other comparisons exploit different features of the design of the EITC. Ellwood (2000) and Rothstein (2005) use the fact that the shape of the credit implies different incentives at different hourly wages and compare single mothers at different wage or skifi levels. EL (1996), Hotz et al. (2002) , and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) exploit the second child marginal credit and compare single women with one versus those with two or more children.
To illustrate the findings from the difference-in-difference literature, figure 3.5 presents annual employment rates for women over the period 1984-2003 . We show the employment rates for four groups: single women with children, single women without children, married women with children, and married women without children. We use the March CPS, where employment is defined by any work over the calendar year, for these calculations. Several authors (Ellwood 2000 , Rothstein 2005 , Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000 find that the group with the most to gain from EITC expansions (e.g., women with lower wages, lower education levels, more children, and single women) experienced larger gains in employment rates. To illustrate these findings, the next two figures reproduce results from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) and Rothstein (2005) . the difference is normalized to 0 in 1984.13 The figure shows that single mothers' employment increased relative to each of these control groups, and the gains are well timed to the expansions of the EITC in 1986 , 1990 , and 1993 . Figure 3.7, reproduced from Rothstein (2005 , extends the single-motherversuschi1dlesssinglewornan comparison and estimates difference-in-difference models of the 1993 expansion by wage level. The figure shows that employment increased with OBRA93 for all single mothers relative to childless women and, as expected, the impacts decrease with the woman's wage.
Another approach recognizes that tax-transfer policy has nonneutral effects within groups and uses individual variation in net wages and net non-labor income. Consequently, identification is based on cross-sectional and time variation in the EITC and federal taxes. For example, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) use instead state-time variation in labor supply incentives and measure the gains to work from wages, net of federal and state taxes, and transfer benefits (AFDC/TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid).14 Overall these studies suggest a strong positive relationship between the EITC and employment rates of single women with children.
Further, the results are remarkably consistent across different policy expansions, different control groups, and different methodologies. The estimated size of the labor supply effect differs depending on the particular expansion considered. Eissa and Liebman (1996) find that the 1986 expansion of the EITC led to a 2.8 percentage point increase in participation (out of a base of 74.2) for single mothers. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find that 60 percent of the 8.7 percentage point increase in annual employment of single mothers between 1984 and 1996 is due to the EITC. They find that a smaller amount, 35 percent of the increase in participation between 1992 and 1996, is due to the EITC (with the remainder due to welfare reform and other changes). The range of the implied labor force participation elasticity with respect to net income across all studies is quite narrowbetween 0.69 and 1.16 (Hotz and Scholz 2003 
Hours Worked
The EITC is expected to unambiguously reduce hours worked by the vast majority of eligible workers. In sharp contrast to the findings above, however, there is little evidence consistent with this prediction.
A limited set of papers have examined the impact of the EITC on the hours worked by single mothers. This is in part because estimating the hours worked response of workers to the EITC budget constraint is fundamentally a harder empirical problem. In particular, one has to deal with the selection of individuals into the labor force. Eissa and Liebman (1996) apply their difference-in-difference model to annual hours worked (conditional on working) and find a small positive (and marginally significant) impact on all single mothers and a zero impact on low-educated single mothers. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) find mixed (positive and negative) but insignificant impacts of the EITC on hours worked (conditional on working). Rothstein (2005) finds no difference between single mothers and childless single women in weekly hours worked (conditional on working) across the wage distribution. Keane and Moffitt (1998) estimate a structural model of labor supply choice and simulate the effect of the EITC on total hours but do not present a separate estimate for those already working. To ifiustrate the findings from the literature, figure 3.8 presents average hours worked (conditional on working) for working single women with and without children over 1984-2003 using our CPS sample described above. Consistent with the studies surveyed, the figure provides no evidence that hours of work decreased for single mothers relative to single women without children as the EITC expanded. Figure 3 .9 refines this analysis by focusing on the phase-out region of the credit where the marginal tax rates are highest. Specifically, the figure plots average earnings for single women with earnings within $1,000 of the 1996 phase-out region of the credit. Consider a single woman with two children who, in 1984, earned $15,000 per year. At that time, she was above the EITC breakeven earnings point. After the 1986 expansions, the same woman (at the same real earnings level) faced a 10 percent EITC phase-out rate. After the 1990 EITC expansions, the phase-out rate she faced was about 14 percent, and finally after the 1993 expansions the phase-out was up to about 21 percent. Single mothers with earnings in this range (which we adjusted for a change in prices each year) are in the range where the tax rates have increased the most. Strikingly, figure 3.9 shows no pattern of a reduc- 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Year lion in hours worked for single women with children relative to single women without children. Another source of evidence builds on the prediction from labor supply theory that taxpayers should be bunched at the kinks in the EITC schedule (and should be less present at the end of the EITC schedule). Liebman (1998) and Saez (2002) use tax return data and find no evidence consistent with these predictions. At the end of this section, we return to these results and discuss why the literature finds a participation effect but no hours worked effect.
The EITC and Labor Supply of Married Taxpayers
While the literature on married women and the EITC is limited, the results are quite consistent with the theoretical expectations. In our earlier work (Eissa and Hoynes 2004) , we estimate a differencein-difference model comparing married mothers to married women without children and find that the 1993 EITC expansion led to a one percentage point reduction in the participation rate of married mothers. These results are ifiustrated in figure 3 .10, reproduced from Eissa and Hoynes (2004) , which presents estimates of the change (relative to 1984) in average employment rates for married women with children compared to married women without children (controlling for demographics, macroeconomic cycles, and state and year fixed effects). For comparison, the figure also shows the change (relative to 1984) in the average EITC for their sample. This shows that employment by married mothers declined relative to that of childless married women following the 1990 and 1993 expansions (though not the 1986 expansion). This finding is consistent with Ellwood (2000) who compares married mothers in high-and low-wage quartiles and finds that expansions of the EITC are associated with a reduction in labor market participation by married mothers. We also estimate (in Eissa and Hoynes 2004) a reduced form employment model for married women (as secondary earners) and parameterize the impact of the EITC and federal taxes on after-tax gains to entering work. We find that the expansions in the EITC between 1984 and 1996 led to about a one percentage point reduction in the employment of married mothers. These estimates are similar to but somewhat smaller than our difference-in-difference estimates.
In Eissa and Hoynes (forthcoming), we find that expansions in the EITC are also associated with reductions in hours worked for married women who are working. We estimate hours of work as a function of after-tax wages and unearned income, again assuming women are secondary earners. We instrument for the after-tax wage using tax parameters. We find that expansions in the EITC from 1984 to 1996 led to a small, 1 to 4 percent, decrease in annual hours for married women with children. Heim (2005) estimates a structural model of family labor supply and finds similar impacts on hours worked of married women (yet he finds no impact of the EITC on the employment of married women). A consistent and somewhat puzzling finding in the empirical literature on the EITC and labor supply is the large response of the participation decision and the lack of any response in the reported hours worked by taxpayers in the labor force. Here, we focus on single mothers who, as noted above, represent over three-quarters of EITC recipients.
The puzzle is why no impact on hours worked is found in any evaluation of the EITC. Theory suggests that we should observe a decline in the hours worked by all taxpayers beyond the phase-in of the credit. While the income effect operates to reduce hours worked in the flat region, both income and substitution effects operate to reduce hours worked in the phase-out region of the credit.
We review several explanations that have been offered. The first explanation is based on a standard finding in the empirical labor supply literature: the labor supply elasticity falls when estimated using a sample of working (rather than all) women (Mroz 1987 , Triest 1990 ). The implication of this finding is that the participation (extensive) margin is more responsive than the hours (intensive) margin. It may well be that the hours worked elasticity is too small to be estimated precisely using quasi-experimental approaches. If, for example, the elasticity of hours worked by single women with children is 0.3, then the 1993 EITC expansion would reduce hours of work by 8 percent.'6 It is not unreasonable to consider this reduction too small to be identified empirically, especially given the somewhat crude comparison-of-means approach typically used. If this is correct, then the next question is, Why is the elasticity on the intensive margin consistently lower than the extensive margin?
One reason why there may be no effect of the EITC on hours worked is that workers are unable to choose continuous hours of work. This would occur if, for example, workers are bound by institutional restrictions or by norms for part-and full-time work.17 To examine the validity of this explanation, figure 3.11 presents the distribution of annual hours worked for our CPS sample of single mothers in 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2000. (Note this includes all single mothers and, in particular, is not limited to those with earnings in the EITC eligible range.) Two observations are worth noting. First, annual hours are highly concentrated at full-time work. While some single mothers work part-time (primarily part-year), the majority of single mothers work full-time (full year). Second, the increase in employment mirrors the increase in full-time, full-year work. One (testable) interpretation of this trend is that new workers enter the labor market at full-time workconsistent with a labor supply model with large fixed costs of work.
Another reason why no hours-worked effect has been estimated is that reported hours in the survey data Finally, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the structure of the EITC schedule. Almost all taxpayers receive the EITC as a lump sum payment with their annual tax return (Friedman 2000) , and therefore have little opportunity to learn about the features of the credit. This may be especially true for the phase-out region of the credit, in part because of the confounding effects of non-EITC federal income taxes. This EITC structure and its delivery are in contrast to the monthly reporting period in welfare programs and to the weekly or biweekly paycheck and its opportunities for learning about FICA or ordinary income taxes. Further, informal and formal surveys of people eligible for the EITC suggest that knowledge about the credit is relatively high, though by no means universal (Liebman 1998 , Phillips 2001 , Smeeding et al. 2000 , Romich and Weisner 2000 . Phillips, for example, finds that about 66 percent of families nationally had heard of the EITC. There is scant evidence, however, that those likely eligible for the credit understand its structure or the different incentives implied.
6.2 Implications for Optimal Tax and Welfare The finding that labor force participation responses are more significant than hours worked responses has several important implications for the design of tax-transfer programs and the welfare evaluation of taxation. Recent work has shown that accounting for labor force participation responses can change the optimal transfer program (Saez 2002) . More precisely, this work has shown that with sufficiently high participation elasticities, the optimal tax-transfer scheme can be similar to the EITCwith negative marginal tax rates at the bottom of the earnings distribution. On the other hand, an EITC would be inefficient in a standard model with only intensive (hours worked) responses. '8 Liebman (2002) extends this work by examining more closely the optimal design of the EITC. He uses a micro-simulation model calibrated to 1999 CPS data to illustrate the trade-offs in the design of an EITCincluding the optimal maximum credit, phase-in and phaseout rateswith fixed costs and participation effects. Liebman finds that the efficiency cost of transferring income through the EITC is substantially lower than previous studies have found, in large part because of the participation response of single mothers and the associated reduced welfare spending. His simulations suggest a cost of less than $2 to provide a transfer worth $1 to EITC recipients. Eissa, Eleven, and Kreiner (2005) take a different approach and examine the impact of participation responses on the welfare evaluation of actual tax reforms. They extend the standard framework for welfare evaluation of tax reforms to account for discrete labor market entry by way of non-convexities in preferences and budget sets. Such nonconvexities are significant because they allow first-order welfare effects along the extensive (participation) margin. EKK simulate the effects of the 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2001 tax acts in the United States and show that each had different effects on tax rates along the intensive and extensive margins. The 1993 EITC expansion, for example, reduced the tax rates on labor force participation but increased the marginal tax rates on hours worked for most workers. The authors show that conflating these two tax rates in welfare analysis can be fundamentally misleading. For tax reforms that change average tax rates differently than marginal tax rates (such as the 1993 expansion of the EITC), ignoring the participation margin can lead to even the wrong sign of the welfare effect.
6.3 Incidence Understanding the effects of the EITC on wages is directly relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of the EITC and its longer-run effects of labor supply. If the EITC reduces gross wages below what they would have been otherwise, the credit may do little, if anything, to encourage labor supply, and may operate to the primary benefit of low-wage employers.
Recent work by Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) directly examine the effect of the EITC on pre-tax wages, using very different methods.
Leigh uses variation across states in the presence and generosity of state EITC add-ons and finds a very strong negative effect of the credit on wages, implying very little benefit of the credit for its recipients. One drawback to Leigh's approach is that state EITCs are small relative to the federal program, and many recipients may not be aware of their existence. As a consequence, behavioral responses may be muted, making it difficult to identify the incidence of the credit. Rothstein uses variation from the 1993 federal credit expansion along the wage distribution and finds that low-skifi women's wages actually increased slightly even as their labor force participation increased. These results imply an upward-sloping demand curve, though they are by no means sufficiently precise to reject a small downward slope. One possible explanation for the conflicting findings of the Leigh and Rothstein studies is the different sources of identification. Clearly more work needs to done to increase our understanding of the broader labor market effects of the E1TC.
Conclusions
An unusual feature of the EITC is its explicit goal to use the tax system to encourage and support those who choose to work. A large body of work has evaluated the labor supply effects of the EITC and has generated several important findings regarding behavioral response to taxes. This paper reviews this empirical literature and focuses on two main lessons. It argues that perhaps the main lesson learned from the evidence is the confirmation that real responses to taxes are important; labor supply does respond to the EITC. The second major lesson is related to the nature of the labor supply response, namely, that the response is concentrated along the extensive (entry) margin rather than the intensive (hours worked) margin. We discuss different explanations of this pattern of labor supply responses and its implications for the optimal design of tax-transfer programs and for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms.
Empirical evidence suggests that transferring dollars to the needy using an EITCrather than a negative income taxmay be optimal.
This evidence cannot yet support more precise judgments about the optimal design of the EITC, however. That would requireamong other thingsidentifying the hours of work response of workers to the EITC. Our analysis of married couples focuses on married women because they have been found to be considerably more responsive to changes in wages and income than married men.
Beginning in 1994, a small credit is available to low-income workers without children.
See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for a more extensive discussion of EITC rules.
TRA86 returned the real maximum credit to its 1975 level and indexed the EITC for inflation.
Legislation adopting a state EITC in Virginia was passed in 2004 but will not take effect until January 2006. In addition, local governments in Montgomery County, Maryland, and Denver, Colorado, offer their own version of EITCs.
Another dimension of labor supply which we do not discuss here is human capital accumulation. This is examined in Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002) and reviewed in Hotz and SchoLz (2003) .
We discuss later the potential impact of the EITC on wages earned by less-skilled workers.
An important omission here are means-tested transfers such as AFDC/TANF and food stamps. These programs have large implicit tax rates and create large disincentives to enter and increase work (Moffitt 1992) . Ignoring transfer programs does not affect the qualitative conclusions in this section.
These calculations assume that the individual bears the burden of the entire FICA tax, with a combined marginal tax rate of 15.3 percent. For these calculations, total taxes paid equal federal income tax plus the payroll tax less the (nonrefundable and refundable) child tax credit and the EITC.
The figures in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) suggest thatmeasured by relative earningswomen are predominantly secondary earners. In a sample of couples with a high school education or less, about 90 percent of all wives, and 85 percent of working wives, earn less than their husbands. In this discussion and in the literature more broadly, women are assumed to be secondary earners.
We limit the analysis to women age 19-44 who are not in school or disabled. We also exclude women with positive earnings but zero hours and women with positive hours and zero earnings. Single women are divorced, separated, widowed, or never married and married women include those with a spouse present. The results are based on the CPS survey years 1985-2004. Meyer and Rosenbaum's (2000) estimates are based on a sample from the March CPS for [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . The estimates are from a probit model that includes controls for demographic variables, residential location, unearned income, state unemployment rate (and its interactions with single mother and education level), and state and year fixed effects. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) also control for welfare reform variables and state spending on educational training, job search assistance, and child care assistance for AFDC recipients. The gains to work are obtained by integrating over the empirical distribution of wages and hours worked for working women and calculating net income at each wage-hours possibffity.
This range excludes the estimates from Hotz et al. (2002) . Their studies differ from the others in that their sample is limited to welfare recipients (or prior recipients).
The 1993 expansion in the EITC increased the phase-out rate to 21.06 (15.98) percent from 13.93 (13.21) percent for families with one child (two or more children). Assuming the woman faces a 15 percent marginal tax rate and the full 15.30 percent PICA rate, this implies a 13 percent reduction in the net of tax wage.
Alternatively, one can argue that a worker can change jobs as an additional way to change hours.
Saez shows that the optimal program is instead a classical negative income tax program, with a substantial income guarantee that is phased out at a high rate.
